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Abstract—Data collecting agents in large networks, such as the
electric power system, need to share information (measurements)
for estimating the system state in a distributed manner. However,
privacy concerns may limit or prevent this exchange leading
to a tradeoff between state estimation fidelity and privacy
(referred to as competitive privacy). This paper builds upon a
recent information-theoretic result (using mutual information to
measure privacy and mean-squared error to measure fidelity)
that quantifies the region of achievable distortion-leakage tuples
in a two-agent network. The objective of this paper is to
study centralized and decentralized mechanisms that can enable
and sustain non-trivial data exchanges among the agents. A
centralized mechanism determines the data sharing policies that
optimize a network-wide objective function combining the fideli-
ties and leakages at both agents. Using common-goal games and
best-response analysis, the optimal policies allow for distributed
implementation. In contrast, in the decentralized setting, repeated
discounted games are shown to naturally enable data exchange
without any central control nor economic incentives. The effect of
repetition is modeled by a time-averaged payoff function at each
agent which combines its fidelity and leakage at each interaction
stage. For both approaches, it is shown that non-trivial data
exchange can be sustained for specific fidelity ranges even when
privacy is a limiting factor.
Index Terms—competitive privacy, distributed state estimation,
non-cooperative games, discounted repeated games
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing demand for sustainable energy in the in-
formation era requires a highly efficient and reliable electric
power system in which renewables can be effectively inte-
grated. Given the size and complexity of the electric net-
work, sustained and reliable operations involve an intelligent
cyber layer that enables distributed monitoring, processing
and control of the network. In fact, data collection and
processing is performed locally at various collecting entities
(e.g., utility companies, systems operators, etc.) that are spread
out geographically. The interconnectedness of the network
requires that these distributed entities share data amongst
themselves to ensure precise estimation and control, and in
turn, system stability and reliability. Despite its importance,
data sharing in the electric power system is limited - some-
times with catastrophic consequences [2], [3] - because of
competitive interests or privacy concerns. Furthermore, this
problem of distributed computation, control and data sharing
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is not specific to electrical power networks and may arise
in other critical infrastructure networks (e.g., air transport,
electronic healthcare, and the Internet). We henceforth refer
to this problem as competitive privacy as in [4].
The notion of privacy is predominantly associated with
the problem of ensuring that personal data about individ-
uals, stored in a variety of databases or cloud servers, is
not revealed. Quantifying the privacy of released data has
captured a lot of attention from the computer science and
information theoretic research communities leading to two
different rigorous frameworks: differential privacy introduced
by Dwork et al. [5], [6]; and information-theoretic privacy
developed in [7]. The first framework focuses on worst-case
guarantees and ignores the statistics of the data; while the latter
focuses on average guarantees and is cognizant of the input
data statistics; their appropriateness depends on the application
at hand. In the information era, however, privacy restrictions
also appear in data exchange contexts as detailed here; it was
first studied via an information-theoretic framework in [4].
For the distributed state estimation problems via data
exchange (as applied to the electric power system), the
information-theoretic competitive privacy framework holds the
following advantages: (a) takes into account the statistical
nature of the measurements and underlying state (e.g., complex
voltage measurements in the grid that are often assumed to
be Gaussian distributed); (b) combines both compression and
privacy in one analysis by developing rate and privacy optimal
data sharing protocols; and (c) quantifies privacy over all
possible sequence of measurements and system states.
The competitive privacy information-theoretic framework
introduced recently in [4] studies data sharing among two
interconnected agents when privacy concerns limits data shar-
ing, and therefore, the fidelity of distributed state estimation
performed by the agents. The authors proposed a distributed
source coding model to quantify the information-theoretical
tradeoff between estimate fidelity (distortion via mean-square
error), privacy (information leakage), and communication rate
(data sharing rate). Every achievable distortion-leakage tuple
represents a four-dimensional vector of opposing quantities
that cannot be optimal simultaneously; minimum distortion for
one agent implies maximum leakage for the other; minimum
leakage for one agent implies maximum distortion for the
other. A pertinent question follows: how to choose such a
tradeoff in practice?
The objective of this work is to address this question via
mechanisms that can enable and sustain specific distortion-
leakage tuples in both centralized (a unique decision-maker)
and decentralized settings (each agent has his own individual
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2agenda). Game theory is a mathematical toolbox for studying
interactions among strategic agents and has established its
value in a wide-variety of fields including wireless commu-
nications [8], [9]. While often applied in the non-cooperative
and decentralized context, even in centralized settings, game
theory can be valuable when devising efficient and distributed
algorithms to compute the solution; in fact, these tools can be
very useful to solve difficult, non-convex problems that arise
in multi-agent models with multiple performance criteria (such
as leakage vs. fidelity) as we present later in the sequel.
Our first approach assumes a central controller that imposes
the data sharing choices of the two agents (e.g., when electric
utility companies share their data with a central systems
operator). The network-wide objective function captures both,
the overall leakage of information and the total distortion
of the estimates of the two agents via their weighted sum.
To circumvent the non-convexity of this objective function,
we exploit the parallel between distributed optimization prob-
lems and potential games [10]. The Nash equilibria of the
resulting common-goal game are the intersection points of
the best-response functions which turn out to be piece-wise
affine. Moreover, using game theoretic tools we provide a
distributed algorithm - the iterative best-response algorithm
- that converges to an optimal solution. Our results show that
the central controller can smoothly manipulate the distortion-
leakage tradeoff between two extremes: both users share fully
their data (minimum distortion - maximum leakage) or not at
all (maximum distortion - minimum leakage). Specifically, not
all information-theoretic tuples can arise as outcomes, but only
the optimizers of the network-wide objective function.
If there is no central controller (e.g., when agents are two
systems operators that need to share data to monitor large parts
of the electric grid), each agent chooses its own data sharing
strategy to optimize its individual distortion-leakage tradeoff.
In [11], we showed that data sharing decreases the distortion of
the agent receiving data while the sharing agent only increases
its leakage. Thus, when the interaction takes place only once
(i.e., one-shot interaction), rational agents have no incentive
to share data. Economic incentives overcome this issue [11]
and all distortion-leakage tuples can be achieved assuming that
agents are paid (by a common moderator) for their information
leakage.
In the second part of this paper, we show that pricing is
not the only mechanism enabling cooperation. If the agents
interact repeatedly over an indeterminate period, tit-for-tat
type of strategies (i.e., an agent shares his data as long as the
other agent does the same) turn out to be stable outcomes of
the new game. We show that a whole sub-region of distortion-
leakage tuples (in between the aforementioned extremes) is
achieved without the need for a central authority; effectively,
the agents build trust by exchanging data in the long term.
Preliminary results regarding the repeated interaction have
been presented in [1]. We provide here a complete analysis
and detailed proofs. Moreover, in this current version, we:
(i) introduce different discount factors to model individual
preferences for present vs. future rewards; (ii) give closed-
form bounds on the discount factors; and (iii) illustrate more
results.
Fig. 1. Network of physically interconnected nodes. We focus on two communicating
nodes/agents and exploit the possibility of exchanging information about their local
measurements.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we intro-
duce the system model and an overview of the most relevant
information and game-theoretic concepts and prior results. The
common goal non-cooperative game and its Nash equilibria are
analysed in Section III as a simpler alternative to a non-convex
centralized. In Section IV in which we show that repetition the
repeated games framework and study its solutions and achiev-
able distortion-leakage pairs. Numerical results that illustrate
the analysis are also provided. We conclude in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network composed of physically intercon-
nected nodes as illustrated in Figure 1. We focus only on a
pair of such nodes - called agents - which are capable of
communicating and sharing some of their collected data.
Each agent observes a sequence of n measurements from
which it estimates a set of system parameters, henceforth
referred to as states. The measurements at each agent are also
affected by the states of the other agent. For simplicity reasons,
we consider a linear approximation model (e.g., model of
voltages in the electric power network [12]). Denoting the state
and measurement vectors at agent j ∈ {1, 2} as Xnj and Y nj ,
respectively, the linear model is:
Y1,k = X1,k + α1X2,k + Z1,k
Y2,k = α2X1,k +X2,k + Z2,k,
(1)
where α1, α2 are positive parameters. The kth states, X1,k and
X2,k, for all k, are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian random
variables and the additive zero-mean Gaussian noise variables,
Z1,k and Z2,k, are assumed to be independent of the agent
states and of fixed variances σ21 and σ
2
2 , respectively.
This model is relevant to direct current (DC) state estimation
problems in which the agents (e.g., system operators or energy
management entities) need to share their local measurements
(e.g., power flow and injections at specific locations) to
estimate with high fidelity their local states (e.g., complex
voltages).
3Agent j can improve the fidelity of its state estimate if the
other agent i 6= j decides to share some information regarding
his measurements - say fj (Y ni ). At the same time, the amount
of agent i leakage on his state information is constrained (in
the competitive privacy framework of [4]). These conflicting
aspects are measured by information-theoretic concepts: the
desired fidelity and privacy amount to meeting a distortion
(mean-squared error) and a information leakage constraint,
respectively:
E
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
(
Xj,k − Xˆj,k
)2]
≤ Dj , and (2a)
1
n
I(Xnj ; fi(Y
n
j ), Y
n
i ) ≤ Lj , (2b)
where Dj represents the distortion of estimate Xˆnj - which
depends on the other agent’s sharing policy, fj(Y ni ) - from the
actual state Xnj , and Lj is the maximum information leakage.
The mutual information in (2b) measures the average leak of
information per sample about the private state Xnj of agent j
to the other agent. The other agent can infer information on
Xnj from two sources: (i) his own measurements Y
n
i (1); and
(ii) the data shared by agent j, i.e., fi
(
Y nj
)
.
Sankar et al. [4] determined the entire region of achievable
(D1, L1, D2, L2) tuples. The authors devised a particular
coding scheme - based on quantization and binning techniques
- that satisfies the distortion constraints Di and achieves
the minimal leakage Lj constraint (for both agents). We
summarize the resulting achievable distortion-leakage (DL)
region in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. [4] The distortion-leakage tradeoff for a two-
agent competitive privacy problem (described above) is the
four-dimensional set of all (D1, D2, L1, L2) tuples such that:
For all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
• Dj < Dmax,j :
Li(Dj) =
1
2
log
(
m2i
m2iDmin,i + n
2
i (Dj −Dmin,j)
)
;
(3)
• Dj ≥ Dmax,j : Li(Dj) = log (Vj/(Vj − αj)) /2,
with the parameters Vj = 1 + α2j + σ
2
j , E = α1 + α2, nj =
(Vi − αiE)/(V1V2 − E2), mj = (αjVi − E)/(V1V2 − E2),
and
Dmin,j = 1− (α
2
iVj + Vi − 2αiE)
(V1V2 − E2) ,
Dmax,j = 1− 1/Vj .
The maximal and minimal distortions, denoted by Dmax,j
and Dmin,j , represent the extreme cases in which, the other
agent i, either sends no information or fully discloses his
measurements. If Dj < Dmax,j , the distortion constraint is
non-trivial and agent i has to leak information about his own
state. The leakage is increasing with Dj . If Dj ≥ Dmax,j ,
the distortion constraint is trivial, and agent i does not have
to send any data. His minimum leakage is not zero because
agent j can still infer some private data (on agent i state) from
his measurements Y nj .
Notice that the region contains asymmetric tuples in terms
of data sharing. This results from the opposing distortion and
leakage components that cannot be optimal simultaneously:
minimum distortion at one agent corresponds to maximum
leakage at the other, and minimum leakage of one agent
corresponds to maximum distortion at the other. From this
region (which is four dimensional) alone, it is not clear how to
choose such a tradeoff tuple. In this paper, the main objective is
to study different mechanisms that explain how specific tuples
may arise in centralized and decentralized settings.
III. CENTRALIZED SOLUTION VIA COMMON GOAL GAMES
Reliability in the North American electric power network
is ensured by regulatory bodies (such as the North American
Electric Regulatory Corporation (NERC) [13], Federal Elec-
tricity Regulatory Commission (FERC) [2]) and enforced by
regional and independent system operators. Our first approach
is focused on centralized networks in which a central controller
dictates the data-sharing policies of the two agents.
The controller wishes to minimize both the overall estima-
tion fidelity and the information leakage. But, as discussed
in the previous section, the two objectives are opposing and
they cannot be optimized simultaneously; a network-wide
compromise has to be made.
In multi-objective optimization problems, scalarization via
the weighted sum of the different objectives is a common
technique that provides good tradeoff tuples by solving a
simpler scalar problem instead. In some cases (such as convex
optimization problems), the tuples obtained by tuning the
weights among the objectives are all optimal tradeoffs [14].
The network-wide objective function that captures the trade-
off between overall estimation fidelity and leakage - by their
weighted sum - writes as follows:
usys(D1, D2) = −
2∑
j=1
Lj(Di) +
q
2
log
 2∑
j=1
Dj
/
2∑
j=1
Dj
 ,
where the leakage of information Lj(Di) is given in (2b) and
q = wˆ/w˜ > 0 is the ratio of the weighting factors between
the two terms.
For homogeneity reasons, the second term has to relate to
logarithmic information measures. We propose to balance the
information leakage (in bits/sample) with the overall shared in-
formation (also in bits/sample) which is inversely proportional
to the distortion [15, Chap. 10]; as the distortions decrease,
the information revealed per sample (or communication rate)
increase.
The problem reduces to finding the distortion pairs (D1, D2)
- characterizing the data-sharing policies of both users - which
maximize the objective function (5). One can easily check that
this function is not always concave on its domain. By using
a distributed approach to find the solution, we can overcome
this obstacle. Assume each agent controls his own data-sharing
policy which impacts directly on the distortion at the other
agent. The control parameter (or action) of agent j is denoted
by aj = Di. The agents choices are driven by the same
common goal, i.e., the network-wide objective function.
We further exploit the parallel between distributed optimiza-
tion and potential games which has several advantages: (i)
4allows to solve a non-convex problem in a simpler manner; (ii)
leads to an iterative and distributed procedure that converges
to a local optimal tradeoff tuple; and (iii) the central controller
can manipulate this outcome by tuning a scalar parameter
alone. The partial shift of intelligence, from the centralized
controller towards the agents, paves the way of developing
scalable data-sharing policies in more complex networks (of
large number of communicating agents).
We model the common goal game by Gsys =
(P, {Aj}j∈P , usys) in which P , {1, 2} designates the
set of players (the two agents); Aj is the set of actions
that agent j can take. The payoff function of both players,
usys : A1 ×A2 → R, is given by
usys(a1, a2) = −
2∑
j=1
Lj(aj) +
q
2
log
 2∑
j=1
Dj
/
2∑
j=1
aj
 ,
The utility function can be re-written using Theorem 1 as
usys(a1, a2) =
1
2
log
(
(γ1a1 + δ1)(γ2a2 + δ2)
(a1 + a2)q
)
+ C0, (5)
where γj = (nj/mj)2 and δj = Dmin,j − γjDmin,i, C0 =
q/2 log(D1 + D2). Without loss of generality, the additive
constant C0 and the multiplicative positive constant 1/2 in
the payoff function can be ignored in the following analysis
of the NE [16].
The non-cooperative game Gsys falls into a special class
called potential games [10] that have many interesting prop-
erties. Their particularity lies in the existence of a global
function - called potential function - that captures the players’
incentives to change their actions. In our case, the network-
wide objective (5) represents precisely the potential function
of the game. Monderer et al. [10] proved that every potential
game has at least one Nash Equilibrium (NE) solution1. Also,
every local maximizer of the potential is NE of the game.
However, since the potential function is not concave [18], the
game may have other NE points (e.g., certain saddle points of
the potential function).
To completely characterize the set of all NE, we study of
the best-response correspondence defined by:
BRj : Ai → Aj
s.t. BRj(ai) = arg supbj usys(bj , ai),
BR : A1 ×A2 → A1 ×A2
s.t. BR(a1, a2) = (BR1(a2)×BR2(a1)).
The best-response (BR) of agent j to an action ai played
by the other agent i - denoted by BRj(ai) - is the optimal
choice (payoff maximizing one) of agent j given the action of
the other player. The best-response correspondence, BR(·, ·),
represents the concatenation of both agents’ BRs. The optimal
action of agent j for fixed choices of the other agents might
1Nash equilibrium represents the natural solution concept in non-
cooperative games [17] defined as a profile of actions (one action for each
agent) which is stable to unilateral deviations. Intuitively, if the players are at
the NE, no player has any incentive to deviate and switch its action unilaterally
(otherwise, the deviator decreases its payoff value).
not be a singleton, hence the correspondence definition (a set-
valued function).
Nash [19] showed that the fixed points of the BR corre-
spondence are the NE. In our case, the BR functions reduce
to simply piecewise affine functions. Thus, the game Gsys
can be described as a “Cournot duopoly” interaction [17] in
which the set of NE points is completely characterized by
intersection points of the best-response functions BR1(·) and
BR2(·) [20]. Using game theoretical tools, we reduce the non-
convex optimization problem to the analysis of intersection
points of piecewise affine functions.
We further investigate a refined stability property of NE,
namely, their asymptotic stability [17]. This property is im-
portant when the game has multiple NE. In such cases it
seems a priori impossible to predict which particular NE will
be the actual outcome. Nevertheless, if the players update
their choices using the best-response dynamics - the agents
sequentially choose their best-response actions to previously
observed plays by the others [8]) - the outcome of a “Cournot
duopoly” can be predicted exactly, depending on the initial
point. To be precise, the asymptotic stable NE will be the
attractors of this dynamics whereas the other NE will not be
observed generically (except when the initial point happens
to be one of these NE). For a more detailed discussion on
“Cournot duopoly” the reader is referred to [17], [20].
To compute the BRs, we analyze the first-order partial
derivatives of the potential function. We distinguish different
behaviors depending on the emphasis on either the leakage of
information (q ≤ 1) or estimation fidelity (q > 1).
A. Emphasis on the fidelity of state estimation (q > 1)
By developing the first-order partial derivatives of the po-
tential function, the best-responses become:
BRj(ai) =
 Fj(ai), if Dmin,i < Fj(ai) ≤ Di,Di, if Fj(ai) > Di,
Dmin,i otherwise,
(6)
where Fj(ai) = ai/(q − 1) − qδj/((q − 1)γj) is an affine
function of ai with parameters γj = (nj/mj)2, δj = Dmin,j−
γjDmin,i. The intersection point of the two affine functions
F1(·) and F2(·) is a
∗
1 =
q
1−(q−1)2
(
δ1
γ1
(q − 1) + δ2γ2
)
a∗2 =
q
1−(q−1)2
(
δ2
γ2
(q − 1) + δ1γ1
)
.
(7)
The NE can be completely characterized by the intersec-
tion points of the two BR functions in the profile set, i.e.,
∆ , [Dmin,2, D2] × [Dmin,1, D1]. Noticing that the BRs are
piecewise affine functions, the following result is obtained.
Theorem 2. The game Gsys has generically a unique or three
NE assuming the central controller puts an emphasis on the
overall state estimation fidelity, i.e., q > 1. In very specific
cases (on the system parameters), the game may have an
infinite number of NE (when the affine functions Fj(·) are
identical) or two NE (when the intersection point (7) lies on
the border of ∆).
Intuitively, if the network parameters α1 and α2 are ran-
domly drawn from a continuous distribution, the probability
5of having an infinite or two NE is zero. In general, depending
on the relative slopes of the two BRs, the game has a unique
NE (given by (7) provided it lies in ∆) or three NE (one is
(7) and the other two lie on the border of ∆). The details of
the proof are given in Appendix A. In this case, the NE of the
common goal game are either network-wide optimal or saddle
points of the central controller’s objective function (also the
potential function of the game). However, only the NE that
are optimizers of this objective function are asymptotically
stable and can be observed as outcomes of best-response
dynamics/algorithms.
B. Emphasis on the overall leakage of information (q ≤ 1)
As opposed to the previous case, the BR of agent j is a
piecewise constant function given as follows:
BRj(ai) =
{
Di, if C
[q=1]
i or C
[q<1]
i
Dmin,i otherwise,
(8)
with the following conditions
C
[q=1]
i : q = 1 and ai >
δi
γi
,
C
[q<1]
i : q < 1 and Fj(ai) > Di or(
Dmin,i < Fj(ai) ≤ Di and usys(Dmin,i, ai) ≤ usys(Di, ai)
)
,
where Fj(ai) is defined in (6). The intersection points of such
functions switching between the two extremes, can only lie on
the corner points of ∆.
Theorem 3. The game Gsys has either a unique or two
NE assuming the central controller puts an emphasis on the
leakage of information (q ≤ 1). The NE lie on the four corners
of ∆, depending on the system parameters.
When the game has two NE, they are always given by
the two symmetric extreme corners (Dmin,2, Dmin,1) (both
users fully disclose their measurements) and (D2, D1) (no
cooperation). Otherwise, either of the four corners can be the
outcome of the game, depending on the system parameters.
Also, all NE are asymptotically stable in this case. The proof
is omitted as it is tedious and follows simply by analysing the
intersection of piecewise constant functions. In this case, the
central controller cannot smoothly manipulate the outcome by
tunning q ∈ [0, 1] and only extreme distortion-leakage pairs
are achieved. In the remainder of this section, we focus only
on the case of q > 1, the controller puts an emphasis on the
estimation fidelity.
C. Numerical results
We assume the target distortions to be equal to the maximum
distortions Dj = Dmax,j , j ∈ {1, 2}. First, we consider the
case in which a unique NE exists and q > 2. Fig. 2 illustrates
the water-levels of the potential function and the BRs in ∆
for the scenario: α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.6 and σ21 = σ
2
2 = 0.1.
The NE is the intersection point (aNE1 , a
NE
2 ) = (a
∗
1, a
∗
2) =
(0.2559, 0.2542) and is asymptotically stable. Using a best-
response iteration, the two agents converge always - from any
initial point - to the optimal point. If a small perturbation
occurs, using the same iterative BR dynamics, the agents will
return to this point.
The case in which the game has three NEs is illus-
trated in Fig. 3 for the scenario: α = 1, α2 = 10,
σ21 = σ
2
2 = 0.1 and q = 1.2. The solutions are
(aNE1 , a
NE
2 ) ∈
{
(Dmin,2, Dmin,1), (D2, D1), (a
∗
1, a
∗
2)
} ≡
{(0.1107, 0.0023), (0.9901, 0.5238), (0.2031, 0.1906)}.
Analyzing the plot of the BR functions, we can observe
that the intersection point (a∗1, a
∗
2) is not asymptotically stable:
Assume that a small perturbation moves the agents away
from this point. By iterating the best responses, the agents
get further away and converge to one of the other NEs. The
initial perturbation determines which of the two NE - that are
asymptotically stable - will be chosen.
Fig. 4 illustrates the NEs depending on the parameter q ∈
[0, 100] tuned by the central controller. Both scenarios of Fig.
2 and 3 are considered.
By choosing small values of q, the central controller prefers
large distortions and small leakage tuples; privacy is enforced
in the network. Larger values of q result in opposite tuples
(small distortions and large leakage tuples); cooperation is
enabled among selfish agents. In the case of three NEs, the
discontinuity at q = 1 can be explained by the change in the
BR functions; if q > 1 they are continuous and piecewise
affine; if q ≤ 1 they are discontinuous Heaviside-type of
functions (as seen in Sec. III-B)).
We also remark that not all information-theoretic distortion-
leakage tuples are achieved at the NE. Only the local maxi-
mizers or saddle points of the overall network-wide payoff
function are NE and these tradeoff tuples depend on the
system parameters. To achieve different tuples at the NE, other
objective functions have to be considered (e.g., the sum of
agents’ individual payoff functions in (9)).
IV. DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES
In large distributed networks, the need for continual moni-
toring makes repeated interactions among agents inevitable:
The control of the electric power network depends on the
state estimation performed periodically by distributed entities
that interact with each other over and over. Such a repeated
interaction may build trust among agents leading to sustained
information exchange.
As opposed to the previous section, we do not assume the
presence of a central controller. Rather, we exploit the rep-
etition aspect to achieve non-trivial distortion-leakage tuples
naturally without economic incentives.
One-shot game and pricing: We start with a brief
overview of the non-cooperative game introduced in [11].
Consider the tuple G = (P, {Aj}j∈P , {uj}j∈P), where the
set of players and their action sets are identical to the game
described in Sec. III. The difference lies in the individual
payoff functions: uj , ∀j ∈ P which measures the satisfaction
of agent j and depends on his own action choice but also on
the others’ choices. As opposed to the common-goal game,
each agent cares only of his own leakage of information and
state estimation fidelity. Thus, the payoff function of agent j,
uj : Aj ×Ai → R, is given by
uj(aj , ai) = −Lj(aj) + qj
2
log
(
Dj
ai
)
. (9)
6Fig. 2. Water-levels of the potential (up) and BRs (down) as functions of (a1, a2) ∈
(Dmin,2, D2] × (Dmin,1, D1]. The potential has a unique maximum equal to
(a∗1 , a
∗
2) which is the asymptotically stable NE.
The second term represents the information rate of the data
received from the other agent depending on ai = Dj , i.e.,
the distortion of agent j. The weight qj = wˆj/w˜j is the ratio
between the emphasis on leakage vs. state estimation fidelity
of agent j.
Maximizing the utility in (9) w.r.t. aj is equivalent mini-
mizing only the first term: the leakage of information. Indeed,
the second term is a result of the data shared by the other
agent i, and hence, not in control of agent j. The game
simplifies into two simple decoupled optimization problems;
each agent chooses to stay silent (minimizing its leakage
of information). The only rational outcome is the maximum
distortion - minimum leakage extreme for both agents.
Remark 1. The one-shot game G is somewhat similar to
the classical prisoners’ dilemma [17] (which is a discrete
game as opposed to our continuous game): each agent has
a strictly dominant strategy2 which is that of not sharing any
data (beyond the minimum requirement).
In [11], we show that any tuple in the information-theoretic
region is achievable provided the agents are appropriately
2A strictly dominant strategy is an action that is the best choice of an agent
independent from the others’ choices.
Fig. 3. Water-levels of the potential (up) and BRs (down) as functions of
(a1, a2) ∈ (Dmin,2, D2] × (Dmin,1, D1]. The potential has two local maxima
(Dmin,2, Dmin,1), (D2, D1) and one saddle point (a∗1 , a
∗
2). The saddle point is a
NE not asymptotically stable whereas the other two are asymptotically stable NE.
rewarded. The modified payoff functions which include the
pricing are:
u˜j(aj , ai) = uj(aj , ai) +
pj
2
log
(
Di
aj
)
. (10)
The drawback of such pricing techniques - that rewards
an agent proportionality to his data sharing rate - is the
implicit presence of a mediator (central controller or self-
regulating market) which can manipulate the outcome by
tuning the prices pj > 0. In the following, we show that
repetition enables cooperation among selfish agents - without
any centralized interference.
We assume that the agents interact with each other multiple
times under the same conditions, i.e., they play the same non-
cooperative game G repeatedly. The total number of rounds is
denoted by T ≥ 1. Two cases are distinguished in function of
the available knowledge of T : (i) perfect knowledge of T -
both agents know in advance when their interaction ends; and
(ii) imperfect or statistical knowledge of T - the agents do not
know the precise ending of their interaction.
In both cases, we study the possibility of enabling and
sustaining cooperation by allowing the agents to make only
credible commitments, i.e., commitments on which they have
7Fig. 4. Achievable distortion pairs at the NE obtained by tuning q ∈ [0, 100] for
the scenarios of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Not all distortions pairs can be achieved at the NE
of the common-goal game. The distortion pairs that are achieved are the points which
correspond to either the local maxima or saddle points of the system-wide objective
function.
incentives to follow through. The equilibrium concept we
investigate here is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
subgame perfect equilibrium, defined in the sequel.
A. Strategies, Payoffs and Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We introduce some useful notation and definitions. These
tools are necessary for a clear understanding of the solutions
arising in repeated games.
We assume that the game G described above is played
several times. Repeated games differ from one-shot games
by allowing players to observe the history of the game and
condition their current play on past actions. The history at the
end of stage t ≥ 1 is denoted by h(t+1) = (a(1), . . . , a(t)),
where a(τ) = (a(τ)1 , a
(τ)
2 ) represents the agents’ play or action
profile at stage τ . The set of all possible histories at the end
of stage t is denoted by H(t+1) such that H(1) denotes the
void set. We can now formally define a repeated game.
Definition 1. A repeated game is a sequence of non-
cooperative games given by the tuple
G(T )R = (P, {Sj}j∈P , {vj}j∈P , T ), where P , {1, 2} is the
set of players (the two agents); Sj is the strategy set of agent
j; and vj is the payoff function which measures the satisfaction
of agent j for any strategy profile.
As opposed to the one-shot game, we have to make a clear
distinction between an action - the choice of an agent at a
specific moment (or stage of the game) - and a strategy that
describes the agents’ behavior for the whole duration of the
game. A strategy of an agent is a contingent plan devising his
play at each stage t and for any possible history h(t); more
precisely it is defined as follows.
Definition 2. A pure strategy for player j, sj , is a sequence
of causal functions {s(t)j }1≤t≤T such that s(t)j : H(t) →
[Dmin,i, Di], and s
(t)
j
(
h(t)
)
= a
(t)
j ∈ [Dmin,i, Di].
The set of strategies, denoted by Sj , is the set of all possible
sequences of functions given in Definition 2, such that, at
each stage of the game, every possible history of play h(t)
is mapped into a specific action in Aj to be chosen at this
stage.
In repeated games, the agents wish to maximize their
averaged payoffs over the entire game horizon. We assume
that agents discount future payoffs: present payoffs are more
important than future promises.
Definition 3. The discounted payoff function of player j given
a joint strategy s = (s1, s2) is given by
vj(s) = (1− ρj)
T∑
t=1
ρt−1j uj(a
(t)), (11)
where a(t) is the action profile induced by the joint strategy s,
uj(·) is the payoff function in (9), ρj ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor of player j.
The Nash equilibrium concept for repeated games is defined
similarly to the one-shot games (any strategy profile that is
stable to unilateral deviations). Some of the Nash equilibria
of the repeated games may rely on empty threats [17] of
suboptimal play at histories that are not expected to occur
(under the players’ rationality assumption). Thus, we focus
on a subset of Nash equilibria that allow players to make
only commitments they have incentives to follow through: the
subgame perfect equilibria.
Before defining this concept, we have to define subgames.
Given any history h(t) ∈ H(t), the game from stage t onwards,
is a subgame denoted by GR(h(t)). The final history for this
subgame is denoted by h(T+1) = (h(t), a(t), . . . , a(T )). The
strategies and payoffs are functions of the possible histories
consistent with h(t). Any strategy profile s of the whole
game induces a strategy s|h(t) on any subgame GR(h(t)) such
that for all j, sj |h(t) is the restriction of sj to the histories
consistent with h(t).
Definition 4. A subgame perfect equilibrium, s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2), is
a strategy profile (in a repeated game with observed history)
such that, for any stage and any history h(t) ∈ H(t), the
restriction s∗|h(t) is a Nash equilibrium for the subgame
GR(h(t)).
This equilibrium concept is a refinement of the NE because
it is required to be a NE in every possible subgame aside from
8the entire history game. We analyze this solution concept for
two different cases in function of the available knowledge of
the end stage: perfect knowledge and imperfect or statistical
knowledge of T .
B. Perfect knowledge of end stage
We assume the agents know in advance the value of T ,
i.e., when the game ends precisely. We show that data-sharing
beyond the minimum requirement cannot be enabled in this
case.
Corollary 1. Assuming the agents know perfectly the value of
T , the discounted repeated game G(T )R has a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium s∗ described by “no data sharing beyond
the minimum requirement ” at each stage of the game and for
both agents:
s
(t),∗
j = Di, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T},∀j ∈ P. (12)
The proof is omitted as it follows similarly to the repeated
prisoners’ dilemma (using an extension of the backward in-
duction principle to dominance solvable games [17]). The key
element is the strict dominance principle: a rational player
will never choose an action that is strictly dominated. The
same result remains true if the discounted payoffs are replaced
with average payoffs, vj(s) = 1T
∑T
t=1 uj(a
(t)). Moreover,
Theorem 1 extends to a general class called dynamic games
in which the system parameters (α(t)1 , α
(t)
2 , σ
(t)
1 , σ
(t)
2 ) may
vary at every stage of the game. The same reasoning holds
since, at any stage of the game, the action corresponding to
“no data sharing beyond the minimum requirement” is the
strictly dominating one.
The only achieved distortion-leakage tuple is the maximum
distortion-minimum leakage - similarly to the one-shot game.
The main reason why cooperation is not sustainable is that
agents know precisely when their interaction ends. Next, we
consider that the agents interact over an indeterminate period
(they are unsure of the precise ending).
C. Imperfect knowledge of end stage
We assume here that the players do not know the value of
T (the end stage). The discount factor ρj can be interpreted
as the agent’s belief (or probability) that the interaction goes
on (see [21] and references therein). The probability that the
game stops at stage t is then (1 − ρj)ρt−1j . The discounted
payoff (11) represents an expected or average utility. Thus,
we assume that agent j know ρj which models its belief on
the interaction continuing or not, at every stage (the probability
that the game goes on).
The strategy of playing the one-shot NE at every stage is a
subgame perfect equilibrium in this case as well.
Theorem 4. Assuming imperfect knowledge of the end stage
and that Dmin,j > 0 for all j ∈ P , in the discounted repeated
game G(ρ)R = (P, {Sj}j∈P , {vj}j∈P), the strategy “do not
share any information beyond the minimum requirement” at
each stage of the game and for both agents is a subgame
perfect equilibrium, i.e. :
s
(t),∗
j = Di, ∀t ≥ 1,∀j ∈ P. (13)
Fig. 5. The set of all payoff pairs. The low-left corner is the one-shot Nash equilibrium.
The darker area is the subset of payoff pairs strictly better than the one-shot NE q1 =
q2 = 5.
The details of the proof are reported in Appendix B. Unlike
the case of perfect knowledge of T , we show that this is not
the only possible outcome and other distortion-leakage pairs
can be achieved.
Inspired from the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, our ob-
jective is to show that non-trivial exchange of information
can be sustainable. Consider the action profiles (D∗2 , D
∗
1) ∈
[Dmin,2, D2)×[Dmin,1, D1) which perform strictly better than
the one-shot NE for both agents:{
u1(D
∗
2 , D
∗
1) > u1(D2, D1)
u2(D
∗
1 , D
∗
2) > u2(D1, D2).
(14)
Such tuples may be expected to represent long term contracts
or agreements between rational agents. Other tuples will never
be acceptable: By not sharing any data, an agent is guaranteed
at least the one-shot NE payoff value. In the game theoretic
literature, these utility pairs are also known as individually
rational payoffs [22].
These payoffs can be visualised in Fig. 5 for the scenario:
α1 = 0.9, α2 = 0.5, σ21 = σ
2
2 = 0.1, Dj = Dmin,j +
0.5(Dmax,j − Dmin,j), q1 = q2 = 5. The plotted area
represents the set of all payoff pairs. The four corner points
represent the four extremes: (D2, D1) (the low-left corner: the
one-shot NE), (Dmin,2, D1) (the upper-left corner: the most
advantageous for agent 2 - he shares nothing while agent 1
fully discloses his data), (D2, Dmin,1) (the low-right corner:
the most advantageous for agent 1) and (Dmin,2, Dmin,1) (the
upper-right corner: both agents fully disclose their data, maxi-
mizing their leakage). The darker area (in black) represents the
subset of pairs satisfying (14). The lighter area (in magenta)
represents the payoff pairs rejected by one or both rational
players.
To gain more insight on these achievable agreement points,
we explicit the payoff functions expressions in (9):{
uj(Di, Dj) = −Lj(Di)
uj(D
∗
i , D
∗
j ) = −Lj(D∗i ) + qj2 log
(
Dj
D∗j
)
.
(15)
Data-sharing beyond the minimal requirement has two op-
posing effects: i) the leakage terms increase (Lj(Di) <
9Lj(D
∗
i ), ∀ D∗i < Di); and ii) the estimation fidelity terms
increase (log(Dj/D∗j ) > 0, ∀ D∗j < Dj). Thus, the pairs
(D∗2 , D
∗
1) represent the tuples which result in an increase of
the state estimation fidelity that overcomes the loss caused by
the leakage for both agents.
Intuitively, the greater the emphasis on the state estimation
terms, the larger the region of achievable agreement points is.
We also observe that the achievable distortion pairs satisfying
the conditions in (14) must be relatively symmetric distortions
pairs. Otherwise said, both agents have to share their data for
the agreement to be acceptable by both parties.
Unlike the one-shot game or the determined horizon re-
peated game (the agents have perfect knowledge of T ), the
commitment of sharing data resulting in any distortion pair
(D∗2 , D
∗
1) is sustainable under some conditions on the discount
factor. If the probability of the game stopping is small enough,
then the commitment of playing (D∗2 , D
∗
1) is credible and,
thus, sustainable to rational agents.
Theorem 5. Assuming imperfect knowledge of the end stage in
the discounted repeated game GR = (P, {Sj}j∈P , {vj}j∈P)
and for any agreement profile (D∗2 , D
∗
1) ∈ [Dmin,2, D2) ×
[Dmin,1, D1) that meets the conditions (14), if the discount
factors are bounded by:
1 > ρj >
2[Lj(D
∗
i )− Lj(Di)]
qj log
(
Dj/D∗j
) , (16)
and Dmin,j > 0 for all j ∈ P , then the following strategy is a
subgame perfect equilibrium: For all j, “agent j shares data
at the agreement point D∗i in the first stage and continues to
share data at this agreement point if and as long as the other
player i shares data at the agreement point D∗j . If any player
has ever defected from the agreement point, then the players
do not cooperate beyond the minimum requirement from this
stage on.”
A detailed proof is given in Appendix C. This theorem
assesses that both agents can achieve better distortion levels
than the one-shot NE naturally, without the interference of a
central authority or economic incentives. The optimal strategy
is a tit-for-tat type of policy: Each agent fulfils his part of the
agreement and shares data if and as long as the other party
does the same.
Any distortion pair (D∗i , D
∗
j ) in (14) is achievable in the
long term, provided the discount factors are large enough.
The lower bound in (16) depends on the agents’ emphasis
on leakage vs. fidelity. Larger emphasis on the leakage of
information (qj ≤ 1) implies larger discount factors. Thus,
smaller ending probability (or a longer expected interaction) is
needed to sustain data sharing when agents are more sensitive
to privacy concerns.
This lower bound also depends on the specific agreement
pair (D∗2 , D
∗
1). It is again a compromise: Smaller distortion
agreements imply larger leakages of information, thus, larger
discount factors.
In conclusion, the minimum expected length of the in-
teraction needed to sustain an agreement depends on the
agents’ tradeoffs between the leakage of information and state
estimation fidelity resulting from their data exchange.
Theorem 5 may be extended to the case in which the
parameters change at each stage of the game. However, the
conditions on the discount factor would be much stricter.
A different approach should be investigated in such general
dynamic games. This issue falls out the scope of the present
work and is left for future investigation.
D. Numerical results
We focus on the scenario: α1 = 0.9, α2 = 0.5, σ21 =
σ22 = 0.1 and Dj = Dmax,j for j ∈ P . The minimum and
maximum distortions are Dmin,1 = 0.3088, D1 = 0.3926,
Dmin,2 = 0.2183 and D2 = 0.2388. For simplicity, we assume
that both agents have the same belief on the end stage of the
game, i.e., ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ.
If the agents put an emphasis on leakage (e.g., q1 = q2 = 1,
q1 = 1, q2 = 2 or q1 = 2, q2 = 1, there is no distortion
pair (D∗2 , D
∗
1) that strictly improves both players’ payoffs
compared to the one-shot NE (D2, D1). This means that the
improvement in an agent’s estimation fidelity from the data
shared by the other agent is overcome by the loss of privacy
incurred by the agreement point.
If the agents put more emphasis on their estimation fideli-
ties, the region of agreements (D∗2 , D
∗
1) becomes non-trivial.
Figure 6 illustrates this region in the cases: i) q1 = 2, q2 = 2;
ii) q1 = 1, q2 = 5; and iii) q1 = 5, q2 = 5. The coloured
region represents all the possible agreements sustainable in the
long term, whereas the white region represents the distortion
points that cannot be achieved. In all these figures, the upper-
right corner represents the minimum cooperation requirement
(D2, D1).
Very asymmetric distortion pairs (the upper-left and lower-
right regions) are not achievable in the long term; a rational
user will only agree to fulfil equitable data-sharing agreements.
In other words, either both players share information at a non-
trivial rate or none of them does.
The higher the emphasis on state estimation fidelity, the
larger the agreement region and lower the distortion levels
achieved: The minimal distortion pair (Dmin,2, Dmin,1) is only
sustainable in the third case (q1 = q2 = 5) when the emphasis
on the estimation fidelity is high enough for both agents.
We can observe a symmetry regarding the values of ρ
needed to sustain a given agreement pair. The fairer or more
symmetric distortion pairs require a shorter expected game
duration to be sustainable. The most unfair distortion pairs (the
border points on the region of sustainable agreements) require
the longest expected game duration; close to one probability
of the game to continue. Beyond these edges, the difference
between what an agent shares and what he receives in return
is unacceptable, even in a long term interaction.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Data sharing among physically interconnected nodes/agents
of a network improves their local state estimations. When
privacy also plays a role, enabling non-trivial data exchange
often requires incentives.
In a centralized setting, we show that the central controller
can manipulate the data sharing policies of the agents by tun-
ing a single parameter - depending on the emphasis between
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leakage vs. estimation fidelity. A whole range of outcomes can
be chosen in between two extremes: both agents fully disclose
their measurements (minimum distortion - maximum leakage),
and both agents stay silent (maximum distortion - minimum
leakage).
If the network lacks a central controller and the agents are
driven only by their individual agendas, we prove that non-
trivial data sharing cannot be an outcome. Rational agents
cannot trust each other in sharing data when the interaction
takes place only once or in a finite number of rounds. However,
if the agents interact repeatedly in the long term - over an
undetermined number of rounds - then a whole region of
outcomes is achieved depending on the agents’ emphasis on
leakage vs. state estimation fidelity. There is a symmetry in
this achievable region: Rational agents agree only on tit-for-tat
data sharing policies.
This results (long term repetition enables data exchange)
follows from the underlying assumption that agents can
perfectly observe the past plays (the history of the game)
and condition their present choices on these observations. In
practice, this implies important signalling among the agents
which has to be taken into account in future works.
Although our work is focused on the case of two communi-
cating agents, we make a first step in studying distributed so-
lutions to competitive privacy problems in complex networks
such as the electrical power network. Both our centralized
and decentralized approaches use game theoretical tools which
lead to developing distributed and scalable solutions.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Before providing the proof, we start by fully characterizing
the set of NE. Three cases are distinguished depending on
the q parameter that determines the relative slopes of the BR
functions.
1) If q > 2, then there is a unique and asymptotically stable
NE. If the intersection point of the affine functions F1(·)
and F2(·) denoted by (a∗1, a∗2) with a
∗
1 =
q
1−(q−1)2
(
δ1
γ1
(q − 1) + δ2γ2
)
a∗2 =
q
1−(q−1)2
(
δ2
γ2
(q − 1) + δ1γ1
)
.
(17)
lies in the interior of ∆, then it is the NE of the game.
Otherwise, the NE lies on the border of ∆.
2) If q = 2, then we have two different situations. If the
condition δ1/γ1+δ2/γ2 6= 0 holds, then there is a unique
and asymptotically stable NE lying on the border of ∆.
If on the contrary δ1/γ1 + δ2/γ2 = 0, then Fi(aj) ≡
F−1j (aj). In this case, if this affine function intersects
∆ non-trivially, then the game has an infinite number
of NEs which are not asymptotically stable. Otherwise,
the unique NE lies on the border and is asymptotically
stable.
3) If q < 2, then there are two or three different NEs pro-
vided that the intersection point in (7) lies in the interior
or on the border of ∆: this intersection point is the only
asymptotically unstable equilibrium. The other one or
two NEs lie on the corners of ∆, (Dmin,2, Dmin,1) and
Fig. 6. The subset of all possible pairs (D∗2 , D
∗
1 ) that are achieved and the minimal
discount factor ρ needed to sustain them in the long-term interaction for the cases: i)
q1 = 2, q2 = 2; ii) q1 = 1, q2 = 5; and iii) q1 = 5, q2 = 5.
(D2, D1)). Otherwise, there is a unique NE which lies
on the border of ∆ and is asymptotically stable.
Intuitively, the scalar threshold equal to 2 for the parameter
q comes from the relative order among the two slopes of the
BR functions. If q = 2, then the two slopes are identical and
equal to one. In any other case, the slopes of the two curves
are different in the same axis system â1Oa2 (since one of the
two curves would have to be inverted). The relative slopes of
the two curves greatly influence their intersection points and,
thus, the set of NE.
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The proof follows a similar approach as in [20] for the
power allocation game over non-overlapping frequency bands
in the interference relay channel and assuming a zero-delay
scalar amplify-and-forward relaying protocol. We investigate
the NEs of the game Gsys when q > 1 and their asymptotic
stability. A necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees
the asymptotic stability of a certain NE, say (aNE1 , a
NE
2 ), is
related to the relative slopes of the BRs [17]:∣∣∣∣∂BR1∂a2 (a2)∂BR2∂a1 (a1)
∣∣∣∣ < 1 (18)
for all (a1, a2) in an open neighbourhood of (aNE1 , a
NE
2 ). The
analysis of the NE is based on the analysis of intersection
points of the two BR functions in (6).
First, we analyze all the possible cases in which the inter-
section points between the affine functions F1(·) and F2(·) are
outside the interval ∆ or on the two corners: (Dmin,2, D1) or
(D2, Dmin,1). In these cases, the NE is unique and it lies on the
border of ∆. These cases correspond to: (i) F1(D1) ≤ Dmin,2
or F2(Dmin,2) ≥ D1, (ii) F1(Dmin,1) ≥ D2 or F2(D2) ≤
Dmin,1 and the corresponding analysis will not be reported
here as they are tedious and similar to the next more interesting
one. The more interesting case is when F1(Dmin,1) < D2,
F1(D1) > Dmin,2, F2(Dmin,2) < D1 and F2(D2) > Dmin,1.
This means that, if the curves F1(·) and F2(·) intersect, the
intersection point or points lie in ∆ and are NEs of the game
under study. We have again three sub-cases:
a) If q = 2: then the two functions F1(·) and F−12 (·)
have the same slope (equal to one) and thus they are parallel.
• If δ1/γ1 = −δ2/γ2, then the two functions are the same.
All the points on these curves that intersect ∆ are NEs of
the game. Therefore, we have an infinite number of NEs.
The asymptotic stability condition is not met because∣∣∣∣∂BR1∂a2 (a2)∂BR2∂a1 (a1)
∣∣∣∣ = 1,
for all these NEs.
• If δ1/γ1 6= −δ2/γ2, then the two BR function intersect
on the border of ∆ in a unique asymptotically stable point
for which ∣∣∣∣∂BR1∂a2 (a2)∂BR2∂a1 (a1)
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
b) If q > 2: then the NE is unique and a detailed
discussion follows depending on the signs of the follow-
ing inequalities: F1(Dmin,1) Q Dmin,2, F1(D1) Q D2,
F2(Dmin,2) Q Dmin,1 and F2(D2) Q D1 and also on the
relative positions of the intersection points between the two
Fj(·) functions and the border of ∆. We will detail only one
of these cases.
If F1(Dmin,1) ≥ Dmin,2, F1(D1) ≤ D2, F2(Dmin,2) ≥
Dmin,1 and F2(D2) ≤ D1, then the two BR functions coincide
on ∆ with the two functions Fj(·). The unique NE is given
by the intersection point (a∗1, a
∗
2) of F1(·) and F2(·) such that
a∗1 =
q
1−(q−1)2
(
δ1
γ1
(q − 1) + δ2γ2
)
a∗2 =
q
1−(q−1)2
(
δ2
γ2
(q − 1) + δ1γ1
)
.
(19)
It is easy to see that∣∣∣∣∂BR1∂a2 (a2)∂BR2∂a1 (a1)
∣∣∣∣ < 1
and, thus, the NE is asymptotically stable.
c) If q < 2: then the discussion follows similarly depend-
ing on the signs of the following inequalities: F1(Dmin,1) Q
Dmin,2, F1(D1) Q D2, F2(Dmin,2) Q Dmin,1 and F2(D2) Q
D1 and also on the relative intersection points between the
Fj(·) functions with the border of ∆.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The backward induction argument is no longer valid since
agents do not know which stage is the final one. Instead,
we apply the one-stage-deviation principle for discounted
repeated games that are uniformly bounded in each stage [17].
This principle states that a strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2) is
subgame perfect if and only if there is no player j and strategy
sˆj that agrees with s∗j except at a single stage τ and history
h(τ), and such that sˆj |h(τ) is a better response than s∗j |h(τ)
in the subgame G(ρ)R (h(τ)).
First, we have to check the uniform boundedness condition
on the stage payoffs. Indeed, we can show that the stage
payoffs in (9) are bounded as follows:
|uj(a(t)j , a(t)i )| ≤ Lj(a(t)j ) + qj2 log
(
Dj/a
(t)
i
)
≤ (1 + qj) 12 log (1/Dmin,j) .
Given that Dmin,j < 1, under the mild assumptions that
Dmin,j > 0 and that qj is finite, the stage payoffs are
uniformly bounded.
Second, we have to check whether unilateral deviation in
a single stage from the strategy in (13) can be profitable.
If not, then the strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Assume that player j deviates at time τ and history h(τ) by
choosing sˆ(τ)j (h
(τ)) = Dˆi ∈ (Dmin,i, Di) at stage τ . From
then on, this strategy conforms to s∗, i.e., sˆ(t)j ≡ s∗,(t)j , for
all t > τ . This means that the leakage of information of
player j will increase at stage τ and therefore its payoff will
decrease: uj(Dˆi, Dj) < uj(Di, Dj). This implies directly
that vj(sˆj |h(τ), s∗i |h(τ)) < vj(s∗j |h(τ), s∗i |h(τ)). Therefore, no
agent has any interest in deviating at any single stage and the
plan defined in (13) represents a subgame perfect equilibrium.
As opposed to the case in which the perfect knowledge
of T is available, the discounted payoffs play a crucial role
in the one-stage-deviation principle and, thus, this proof is
not readily applicable in the case where a uniform average of
the stage-payoffs is considered. Also, similarly to the case of
perfect knowledge of T , this result extends to a general class
of dynamic games in which the system parameters change at
every stage of the game.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We use the one-stage deviation principle similarly to the
proof of Theorem 4. Assume that no agent deviates in any
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subgame from the agreement point. In this case, the discounted
long-term payoff of player j is equal to uj(D∗i , D
∗
j ), i.e., the
instantaneous payoff achieved at the agreement point. If a
player j deviates at stage τ by choosing sˆ(τ)j = Di > D
∗
i
and then onwards conforms to the strategy by choosing Di,
his discounted payoff is
(1− ρj)
τ−2∑
t=0
ρtjuj(D
∗
i , D
∗
j ) + (1− ρj)ρτ−1j uj(Di, D∗j )+
(1− ρj)ρτj
+∞∑
t=0
ρtuj(Di, Dj) = uj(D
∗
i , D
∗
j ) −
ρτ−1j
[
uj(D
∗
i , D
∗
j )− uj(Di, D∗j ) +
ρj
(
uj(Di, D
∗
j )− uj(Di, Dj)
)]
.
(20)
Notice that uj(Di, D∗j ) − uj(D∗i , D∗j ) > 0 (by sharing more
information, the leakage term for player j increases and his
payoff decreases), and uj(Di, D∗j )−uj(Di, Dj) > 0 (from the
previous observation and condition (14)) for any Di > D∗i .
Under the following sufficient condition on the discount factor:
1 > ρj > max
Di∈(D∗i ,Di]
{
uj(Di, D
∗
j )− uj(D∗i , D∗j )
uj(Di, D∗j )− uj(Di, Dj)
}
, (21)
this discounted payoff for the deviator in (20) is less than the
payoff of no deviation uj(D∗i , D
∗
j ).
Now, let us assume that a deviation has occurred. At stage τ
and for any history h(τ) after this deviation, if player j were to
deviate from the prescribed strategy and choose sˆ(τ)j = Di <
Di and then conform from this stage onwards, its leakage term
would increase and its payoff in stage τ would be strictly less
than if it had not deviated. Thus, no player has any incentive
to deviate at any single stage of the game and for any history
of play and the strategy described in this theorem is a subgame
perfect equilibrium for the discounted repeated game in which
the end stage of the game is not known.
To complete the proof, we have to show that the sufficient
condition in (21) is equivalent to the one in (16). First, from
(3) we observe that the leakage function Lj(Di) is strictly
decreasing with Di (the smaller distortion at agent i the bigger
the leakage term), and, thus, we have dLjdDi < 0. Second, by
replacing the payoff functions expressions in (9) we have:
uj(Di, D
∗
j )− uj(D∗i , D∗j )
uj(Di, D∗j )− uj(Di, Dj)
=
[Lj(D
∗
i )− Lj(Di)]
[Lj(Di)− Lj(Di)] + qj2 log
(
Dj/D∗j
) .
We compute the derivative of the right-side term w.r.t. Di
and obtain:
d
dDi
Lj(D
∗
i )− Lj(Di)
Lj(Di)− Lj(Di) + qj2 log
(
Dj
D∗j
) =
−
Lj(Di)− Lj(D∗i ) + qj2 log
(
Dj
D∗j
)
[
Lj(Di)− Lj(Di)] + qj2 log
(
Dj
D∗j
)]2 (dLjdDi
)
. (22)
From the fact that dLjdDi < 0, equations (14) and (15), we obtain
that the derivative in (22) is strictly positive, and, thus
max
Di∈(D∗i ,Di]
{
uj(Di, D
∗
j )− uj(D∗i , D∗j )
uj(Di, D∗j )− uj(Di, Dj)
}
=
2
Lj(D
∗
i )− Lj(Di)
qj log
(
Dj
D∗j
) .
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